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Author Topic: Vietnam war books and reading  (Read 19063 times)
Huyen
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« Reply #45 on: March 21, 2007, 06:36:01 PM »

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Hi.  New member here.
 

Welcome to our little forum.  It is always nice to hear from someone new.   Especially VN Vets !!   Smiley

You can expect to hear from Radio Researcher.  He is a Vet who was also in Chu Lai and participates here.

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Was in Chu Lai, '67-68, US Army (volunteered for RVN to get out of Alabama...true story) and periodically revisit/renew interest in the experience.


Thank you for your service to the USA and the RVN !!! 

But I don't think Alabama is that bad.  I like the old South.  USA and VN   LOL

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I found this site while trying to do a search for a paperback book i read following my discharge after leaving RVN in 1968.  The book recapped the history and conflict over the little peninsula just south of Chu Lai, a free-fire zone when I was there, which was very enlightening...I would have really liked to have possessed that knowledge about the area while there.  Anyway, I'm drawing a blank on finding the book.  I'd love to do a reread, so if anyone here has a clue (or even search tips) I'd much appreciate it. 


I believe you are referring to the "Van tuong peninsula".   If I am correct this is where the first major American engagement took place in the ground war.  The marines and "Operation Starlight".  Which is also the subject of a book about the operation by Otto J. Lehrack called "The First Battle".  However, this is not the book you are looking for because it is relatively new.  However there are many books that cover this area at least in part. 

I am something of the informal librarian here.  I cannot guarantee anything, but if you could give me a little more information I might be able to help you.  About what year did you read the book?  1969?  This will help me narrow the publication time frame and eliminate some titles.  Was the book about the history of the local area, or was it a larger history that simply covered that area?  Was it solely about military operations or was it a general history of the area?  Did it cover only the American involvement, or also French and prior?  These kinds of details etc.

The more general information you can give me about the material covered in the book, the more likely I will be able to identify it for you.  Again, I will help to the best of my ability.  I cannot guarantee success but will try.

Once again let me welcome you to this little tribute site.  Enjoy the music.  And Welcome Home!!

-H



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Huyen
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« Reply #46 on: April 29, 2007, 10:49:57 PM »



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As the flip side to Gilbert's official account, you should also read Kidder's book (when the budget allows).  Definitely not the technophile perspective.  In fact, Kidder is excruciatingly self-absorbed - but he is also a Pulitzer Prize winner, so at least he is readable.  He had a DF detachment of my RR company, that was situated down at LZ Bayonet, just south of Chu Lai, in support of the 198th LIB.  For a preview, hear his interview and call-in on the book at http://www.onpointradio.org/shows/2005/10/20051006_b_main.asp.  I think you will find it interesting as a contrasting perspective.  I wouild be interested in your take on Kidder and his "literary licensed" characterization of the men around him.

Roger RR.  I ordered the Kidder Book and I will put it in the queue.  Nix should be happy because I used his link to go to Amazon to get it.  I am trying to enlist my "peeps" here to use this link when we buy from Amazon.  After all, we do buy a lot of books around these parts.  Mostly used copies, but I read on the Amazon site that "Associates" get a cut even from "Marketplace" orders.  So maybe after a few more book purchases Nix will have enough money to buy the station some chewing gum  Grin

I will post my comments here after I read the book.

My comments on the Pulitzer Prize:  EDDIE ADAMS won a Pulitzer for his photo of South Vietnamese National Police Chief Gen. Nguyen Loc Loan executing Viet Cong Captain Bay Lop for killing one of his officers and the officer's entire family.  (The photo is famous and I choose not to copy it here.  If you don't remember it you can easily Google it)   At the time the execution photo made big news and is still famous today, but the explanation of what the execution was for is rarely mentioned.  This was a pivotal event in depiction of the war in the US mind and around the world.  Much later in life Eddie Adams would lament about his Pulitzer winning photo saying that Joe Rosenthal won a Pulitzer for his photo of the flag raising on Iwo Jima and they made a monument out of the image in Washington DC, but the only memorial to his Pulitzer winning photograph would likely be in Hanoi. 
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« Reply #47 on: April 30, 2007, 07:43:53 PM »

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I ordered the Kidder Book and I will put it in the queue.  I will post my comments here after I read the book.
Looking forward to it.

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My comments on the Pulitzer Prize:  EDDIE ADAMS won a Pulitzer for his photo of South Vietnamese National Police Chief Gen. Nguyen Loc Loan executing Viet Cong Captain Bay Lop for killing one of his officers and the officer's entire family.
Thank you for bringing out the story behind this event.  I think there were all sorts of anti-war agendae read into (or perhaps I should say "viewed into") this photo (and the related video) that had nothing to do with the circumstances.  It was a vehicle for anti-war sentiment.  My feeling about it has always been:  It was war.  Swift justice was understandable.

-- RR
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« Reply #48 on: May 01, 2007, 12:22:11 AM »


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My comments on the Pulitzer Prize:  EDDIE ADAMS won a Pulitzer for his photo of South Vietnamese National Police Chief Gen. Nguyen Loc Loan executing Viet Cong Captain Bay Lop for killing one of his officers and the officer's entire family.

Thank you for bringing out the story behind this event.

I read so much that I pick up all sorts of information from many different sources.  I have known for years the story of the events in the photo, but only recently did I read about the photographer's regrets for having taken an image that was used completely out of context in a distorted way.  I was very surprised to read his feelings. 

I remember once seeing this same photo on a war era Italian Communist propaganda poster that said, "This is how they die in Viet Nam".


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  I think there were all sorts of anti-war agendae read into (or perhaps I should say "viewed into") this photo (and the related video) that had nothing to do with the circumstances.  It was a vehicle for anti-war sentiment.  My feeling about it has always been:  It was war.  Swift justice was understandable.

In marketing class we talked a lot about selective perception.  It is a powerful thing.  The truth behind this image never mattered, and was not widely reported.  People saw what they wanted to see. 

These events were in the middle of the Tet offensive.  An intense combat situation.  It is one thing to kill a Police officer in the midst of combat.  It is quite another to kill his wife and children deliberately.  That is not combat, that is murder.  I think Summary Justice is the correct phrase.  What  Gen. Nguyen Loc Loan did was understandable given the circumstances.  Under fire like that, given such chaotic and desperate circumstances, I doubt many American Police chiefs would have acted differently.  Fortunately our Police have never had to endure such a thing on our streets. 

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« Reply #49 on: May 06, 2007, 01:21:52 PM »

"Be Men.  This means that if you are communists, join the Viet Minh.  There, there are people who fought well for a bad cause.  But if you are patriots, fight for your country, because this war is yours...... In the dawn of independence, we need more sweat and blood to raise a crop of free men."  - General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, calling for the participation of young Vietnamese in the struggle for an independent and free Vietnam. 

From:  "The Twenty-Five Year Century" by General Lam Quang Thi (RVN)

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« Reply #50 on: May 15, 2007, 08:28:09 PM »

The Short-Timers by Gustav Hasford was an excellent book as was the sequel, The Phantom Blooper.

Anyone who liked Full Metal Jacket should definitely check it out sometime.   Cool
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« Reply #51 on: May 15, 2007, 10:00:50 PM »

The Short-Timers by Gustav Hasford was an excellent book as was the sequel, The Phantom Blooper.

Anyone who liked Full Metal Jacket should definitely check it out sometime.   Cool

While I have not read these books, I have heard of them.  They are in fact the books that Full Metal Jacket is based on are they not?  I don't quite remember for sure, but I think I read somewhere they are the source for FMJ. 

Miss Saigon
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« Reply #52 on: May 16, 2007, 08:41:41 PM »


While I have not read these books, I have heard of them.  They are in fact the books that Full Metal Jacket is based on are they not?  I don't quite remember for sure, but I think I read somewhere they are the source for FMJ. 

Miss Saigon


yes, the first half remains intact while the second half of the movie is based on the second and third parts of the first book
 M16
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Huyen
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« Reply #53 on: May 18, 2007, 07:55:57 PM »

I finished reading "My Detachment" by Tracy Kidder.  The author of this book won a Pulitzer prize for another of his works.  I have not read anything else by Mr. Kidder, but I hope this book is not representative of his work.  If this book is representative than I do not understand the Pulitzer people. 

I have read many memoirs written by people who served in Vietnam.  Of the dozens I have read, this one has the least to recommend itself in my opinion. 

This book is described as being hilarious, sad, gripping, compelling, candid, and a whole host of other accolades.  I didn't once laugh during the entire book.  I didn't see the humor anywhere.  In fact, the only adjective above that I think applied to this book is candid.  This is the story of Kidder's one year tour in Vietnam, and the story he tells about himself does not make me admire or respect him at all.  So in this way I think he was candid.  The self he portrays to the readers is a superficial, lying coward, so this is pretty candid.  However, having read the reviews others have given this book, I think most reviewers found these traits to be endearing.  I did not.  I think the acclaim this book has received has largely been from people who thought poorly of the Vietnam war and found expression of these feelings in this book.  OK, so you didn't agree with the War.  Certainly there are better, more thoughtful and intelligent works that are against the war than "My Detachment". 

The overriding theme of this book is anti Vietnam war, and therefore, by extension anti Army.  These themes progress from start to finish and are proclaimed continuously.  Very early in the book a friend tells Kidder he should be against the war and he buys into this.  He readily admits that he has not given the topic much thought and arrived at his position on the war because of his friend.  His anti war position is very superficial in the beginning.  By the end of the book he has become a true believer in the anti war cause.   The problem with this is we never see this develop throughout the story.  In the beginning he admits to arriving at his position in a superficial way, but never gives us any indication during the story that he has given the matter any more depth of thought.  He presents only the briefest of anecdotes that might be seen as supportive  of his anit war position, but these are few and insignificant.  An example would be his speculating that artillery fired might be killing innocent people.  He does not know that it is.  He has not seen nor heard evidence that it is.  He just assumes that this is probably happening.  In fact, all of his anti war positions are based on assumptions that he makes. 

It is important to emphasize here that nothing happened to Kidder in Vietnam.  Nothing at all.  He did not see any action.  He did not talk to people who saw action.  He was never exposed, even second hand, to the realities of war.  It was not like anyone even came to him and had a conversation about all the bad things happening out there.  Nothing like this happened.  Any opinions he had about the war came solely out of his head.  Like the assumption that artillery was killing innocent people.  He gives us absolutely no concrete arguments whatsoever as to why he opposes the war.  He does so on moral grounds, but never explains what these are nor gives examples.  It is as if he assumes we all know why he feels the way he does, so he doesn't need to explain.  But given his lack of first hand knowledge about the war, I think an explanation would have been helpful in understanding him. 

The only concrete example he ever gave about any military action that involved anything tragic was when he mentioned how the Communists had shelled innocent civilians in a refugee camp.  He just mentions this briefly.  Him being such a highly professed critic of the war one would have thought he would have filled the book with stories like this, only being committed by the Americans.  But he does not. He mentions this one incident during the book, and it was the enemy that did it.  He only mentions it in passing.  No recognition whatsoever. 

The only thing I found interesting in the book was the very brief description he gave of his work.  He was in ASA signal intelligence (Refer to My review earlier on ASA in Vietnam).  His detachment's job was to use radio detection techniques to locate enemy radios, and thus unit locations.  His brief talk about this was interesting, but it was very brief.  However, it was in the description of the work that he made the most interesting comments of the whole book, and the most contradictory.  He stated all along that he was against the war, while never giving reasons, and that the army and government were lying about what was going although he never gives any evidence of this.  But then he writes the following:

"When I'd left the United States, some people in the antiwar movement were still saying this was a war waged only between a corrupt South Vietnamese regime and valiant local insurgents.  But on the part of our map that covered the brigade's AO, most of what you saw were large North Vietnamese units, and just a couple of Vietcong companies.  And here was the kicker..... All of those units, including the two little VC companies, communicated directly with a giant corps headquarters across the border in Cambodia....... which in turn communicated directly with Hanoi.  More than geography separated me from my principled antiwar friends back home....... He should be against the war, of course, but I'd bet he didn't know why"

I was appalled when I read this.  The government and Army had maintained all along that the Vietnam war was an aggression waged by the North to conquer the south.  Here he is sitting on the truth of this and admitting it, but it has no impact on his feeling about the war.  All he does is suggest that the reasons for being opposed to the war have nothing to do with this.  But once again, he fails to tell us what those reasons to be against the war are.  Even so, the statement above was the most interesting part of the book for me.

The other theme of the book was touched on in far more detail than the anti war theme. His dislike for the Army.  But again, Kidder does nothing to offer any credible information for the reader to see and feel empathy for his position.  He joined ROTC in an effort to avoid serious Army duty.  A friend had persuaded him that since he had to do a two year obligation, if he joined ROTC he would have the ability to choose his own path in the Army and avoid anything unpleasant.  OK fair enough, but when he finally finds out he is going to be sent to Vietnam he argues that his Harvard education made such service a waste of material.  Very nice.  He makes this argument to his commander whom he thinks is sympathetic to his anti war, personal feelings.   His commander surprises him by saying that he can't alter the orders, but wouldn't do so even if he could.  So Kidder went to Vietnam. 

Initially Kidder believes that he is too good to be sent to Vietnam.  He makes Kerryesque comments about how the war is for the uneducated and unsophisticated.  However, once he is forced to go to Vietnam he starts to identify with these same people.  He still makes those types of comments about who is fighting the war, but now in a total reversal of his attitude he is their champion.  He also identifies with the enlisted men.  He is an officer but has nothing but contempt for other officers.  In his mind the only good people were the enlisted people.  It was the noble savage myth.  The problem is that he has contempt for anyone who is an officer for no reason whatsoever, and likes all enlisted men no matter how  opprobrious they may be.  Like his position on the war, we are given only middling reasons why he doesn't like officers (At least that is more than he gave us on his war position).  He doesn't like regulations and inspections.  Things like that.  So he hates officers and Lifers.  The problems is, he hates officers just because they are officers.  Officers who are nothing but nice to him, and helpful.  Who have done nothing even remotely untoward to him, he still despises because they are officers.   His attitude make no sense at all. He has a reactionary point of view.  Politically he feels he must be against the war, therefore the Army, so he is and offers no rational reasons for any of this.  In fact the opposite.  If you are an officer he doesn't like you no matter how nice you are to him nor how good a  person.  He is against the war no matter what evidence he has about the atrocities of the enemy.  It just didn't add up. 

He is the champion of the enlisted men, and makes a big display over how he feels he must protect "his men".  But when he says protect, he means from the Army.  Protect them from annoying inspections, Army procedures, and Lifers.   In fact, he has little use for true protection concerns.  His men are supposed to wear their helmets when they leave their area.  He thinks this rule is ridiculous.  The higher ups want him to have his men keep the sandbags maintained around their living and working areas to protect from mortars.  He thinks this is just make work doled out by the Lifers to make the enlisted men miserable.  The real shocker is even when he tells of hearing about people getting killed by mortars around the brigade, he still thinks nothing of the sandbag issue.  In his mind it is simply harassment to fill sandbags.  So much for protecting his men. 

His men didn't respect him.  He showed no leadership qualities whatsoever.  In fact the whole book is a celebration of his weaknesses.  Perhaps this is the part that we are supposed to find humorous, but I found it to be very sad and hard to read.   He wanted to be a good leader, but in his mind his men had to like him for him to consider himself a good leader.  So in an effort to "Protect" his men and make them like him he asks very little of them.  No expectations whatsoever.  So of course, they live up to these expectations.  Everything he does is to align himself with his men against the Army, and try to make them like him.  Yet by the end of the book he is still hopelessly not respected by his men and he knows it.  His sergeant didn't show this desire to be liked and lack of concern for discipline, so the men listened to and respected the sergeant.  But this leadership lesson was lost on Lt. Kidder.  He showed no strength of character whatsoever.  No wonder why when he was on R&R in Singapore a prostitute rejected him and the madam thought he was gay   LOL  In a letter from his girlfriend back in the states she responded to his weaknesses by admonishing him that it was OK for him to be against the war but he shouldn't act like a child in the process.  LOL

So he lied in his letters to family and friends.  He never remotely got anywhere close to any danger, but in his letters he constantly suggested he was in danger in the thick of the war, and that he was a good and respected leader.  He lied to his parents, his fiancĂ©, his friends, and himself.  His lying was almost pathological.  But I guess this makes him candid.  He is a writer so he wrote stories about the war while he was there that he hoped to use for a novel later.  He wrote stories about soldiers in the field.  People for whom he had no examples whatsoever.  He wrote stories of soldiers in combat.  Stories of racial problems among soldiers.  Stories of drug problems.  Stories of Soldiers raping Vietnamese girls.  All the kinds of themes you would see in an Oliver Stone film.  But similar to Oliver Stone (Who at least did see combat), he had no personal knowledge of any such activities nor any hearsay knowledge of such things from other people.  He admits this, yet he wrote these things anyway.  He just invented them like any good story teller. 

I don't understand what the point of this book was, nor why it was showered with such praise?  Kidder painted a truly pathetic picture of himself in this book.  I don't know why other people found this book to be endearing and humorous.  I found it very hard to read.  Almost embarrassing to read. 


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« Reply #54 on: May 20, 2007, 05:02:20 PM »

Thanks for the extensive review, Huyen.  I would request that you also consider posting a shortened version of it at http://www.amazon.com/My-Detachment-Memoir-Tracy-Kidder/dp/0375506152  The preponderance of reviews there, as you point out, are complimentary and they need to be balanced out - for hapless readers like me, who bought the book because Kidder's DF detachment at LZ Bayonet was under the same Radio Research company that I belonged to - Americal Radio Research Company (Provisional), later redesignated the 328th RR Co.  (The main company compound was on the Ky Ha peninsula, north of the Chu Lai airfield, and near the Americal Division headquarters area.  Kidder's detachment, in direct support of the 198th Light Infantry Brigade, was south of the airfield, with the 198th HQ.)

Kidder has pimped the memory of his men, in my opinion, in order to promote his self-absorbed wallowing in his unremarkable service and failure of leadership - converting it to literary credibility, at least among the literary crowd whose anti-militarism knows no bounds and no end.  The people I knew in the same unit, or at least the same company, did not resemble the surly, work-shirking cretins that Kidder describes.  Sure most were irreverant, one-enlistment (four-year) guys who weren't exactly airborne gung ho.  Most of us had had some college at the time and often had to swallow our dislike of some of the Army BS just like all soldiers from time immemorial.  It's just that our "wit" may have been a little more "schooled".  However, most of us were well trained and believers in the importance of our signals intelligence mission.  (Working with our Marine equivalents (early on) certainly served to help us remember, if ever in doubt.)  We knew we were the best ears our commands had in listening to and locating the enemy.  What's more, in addition to direct support, we were part of the vast global network of signals intelligence collection and processing - and we respected that.  We didn't hold Top Secret Crypto clearances without a reason.

I came across the following notes from another DF man in my detachment (408th RR Det), who walked a lot more Vietnamese ground than our privileged son, Kidder, and probably did a lot more to support his country's war effort (note: original material, mispellings not corrected) --

I served with this unit from july of 67 to aug of 68. We were based in Chu Lai and worked with the 5th Mech and the 196th under task force Brown, task force Oregon and the Americal, We handled the field work srdf etc. We maintained a separate compound from the 372nd after it was formed. We kept a 28 man det in the field most of the time. We were working LZ Leslie during tet of 68 and were nearly over run, during a three day seige. I can only remember a few location names. LZ Baldy, hill 35 are a couple. Most sites were in the Qua Sion valley. . . .

The 408th (RR Det) was a det of the 313th RR Bn. out of Tai Nien. It moved into I Corps in early '67 from the Delta. part of TF Brown. Then worked with the 101 AB and 5th Air Cav under TF Oregon. When Americal was formed we started working with them and moved onto the base at Chu Lia. Our shop when we were on base was in the S2 TOC compound. We never became part of the 328th while I was there. I left end of July 68. We were still a det of 313. We did all the com security work and SRDF with linquists and ops from 408th. 328th acted as our ditty boppers and main com link when we were in the field. We worked from Chu Lai up through the Quasion to the DMZ area. I can't remember the names of many of the field sites and lz's we worked from, but we worked with the 196 Inf (Bde) , 5th Mech, 101 Abn, 5th Air Cav, 5th Spec Forces and ARVN "Tiger" div to give you a few.


Finally, in order to further counter Kidder's ineffective portrayal and sullying of the contribution of ASA DF men in the Vietnam War, please remember that the first American GI killed in the war was Spec 4 James Davis, a trained DF operator and early advisor to the ARVN.  For more information on Spec Davis, go to:  http://www.oldspooksandspies.org/davis/davis.html

-- RR
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« Reply #55 on: May 31, 2007, 09:55:36 AM »

Thanks for the extensive review, Huyen.  I would request that you also consider posting a shortened version of it at http://www.amazon.com/My-Detachment-Memoir-Tracy-Kidder/dp/0375506152  The preponderance of reviews there, as you point out, are complimentary and they need to be balanced out -

Well, it wasn't much shorter, but I did edit it a little and then posted it.   Grin

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Kidder has pimped the memory of his men, in my opinion, in order to promote his self-absorbed wallowing in his unremarkable service and failure of leadership - converting it to literary credibility, at least among the literary crowd whose anti-militarism knows no bounds and no end. 


I truly do believe that the only reason this book had any acclaim was because of its politics.  It was not the most interesting story and the character he portrays of himself is very unflattering.  Now, I have read another of the reviews that statess that this is a literary device.  Perhaps it is.  My degree is not in literature, but I know a little something of art.  If this was a painting it would have made me want to look away, not probe it for deeper meaning. 

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The people I knew in the same unit, or at least the same company, did not resemble the surly, work-shirking cretins that Kidder describes.


One cannot say for certain that Kidder's descriptions of his men were accurate, but if one takes the legal standard on this then one must assume that you are more credible than Kidder.  He admits frequently in the book to his lies and exaggerations, therefore, his credibility is impugned and we cannot know what is real and what is not. 

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Sure most were irreverant, one-enlistment (four-year) guys who weren't exactly airborne gung ho.  Most of us had had some college at the time and often had to swallow our dislike of some of the Army BS just like all soldiers from time immemorial.  It's just that our "wit" may have been a little more "schooled".  However, most of us were well trained and believers in the importance of our signals intelligence mission.

Certainly yours was a different form of unit within the Army.  One would expect that it would be staffed with a different kind of service man.  Similar to how in M*A*S*H they kept emphasizing how they were doctors, not soldiers.  So one would expect a different kind of behavior from ASA personnel.  Just as one would expect a different kind from Line Doggies versus Special Forces Operators.  But personality differences does not impugn anyone's character or their dedication to their service.  Kidder may have wanted to champion the enlisted man by describing iconoclastic behavior within the Army ranks, but what he really did was describe behavior that would have been found unacceptable by his Harvard friends, none of whom would have invited any of these men to dinner other than for political reasons.  Poor behavior doesn't transform to good behavior when a political statement needs to be made.  Kidder's behavior was just poor, and he admired poor behavior in others.  At least while he was in Vietnam.  Who knows what he thought of similar behavior back in the world?

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  (Working with our Marine equivalents (early on) certainly served to help us remember, if ever in doubt.)  We knew we were the best ears our commands had in listening to and locating the enemy.  What's more, in addition to direct support, we were part of the vast global network of signals intelligence collection and processing - and we respected that.  We didn't hold Top Secret Crypto clearances without a reason.

I would normally say that Kidder gives us a lot to wonder about by is characterizations, except that since he often admitted to his own twisting of stories there is nothing to wonder about.  We cannot take any of his descriptions at face value.

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I came across the following notes from another DF man in my detachment (408th RR Det), who walked a lot more Vietnamese ground than our privileged son, Kidder, and probably did a lot more to support his country's war effort (note: original material, mispellings not corrected) --

I served with this unit from july of 67 to aug of 68. We were based in Chu Lai and worked with the 5th Mech and the 196th under task force Brown, task force Oregon and the Americal, We handled the field work srdf etc. We maintained a separate compound from the 372nd after it was formed. We kept a 28 man det in the field most of the time. We were working LZ Leslie during tet of 68 and were nearly over run, during a three day seige. I can only remember a few location names. LZ Baldy, hill 35 are a couple. Most sites were in the Qua Sion valley. . . .

The 408th (RR Det) was a det of the 313th RR Bn. out of Tai Nien. It moved into I Corps in early '67 from the Delta. part of TF Brown. Then worked with the 101 AB and 5th Air Cav under TF Oregon. When Americal was formed we started working with them and moved onto the base at Chu Lia. Our shop when we were on base was in the S2 TOC compound. We never became part of the 328th while I was there. I left end of July 68. We were still a det of 313. We did all the com security work and SRDF with linquists and ops from 408th. 328th acted as our ditty boppers and main com link when we were in the field. We worked from Chu Lai up through the Quasion to the DMZ area. I can't remember the names of many of the field sites and lz's we worked from, but we worked with the 196 Inf (Bde) , 5th Mech, 101 Abn, 5th Air Cav, 5th Spec Forces and ARVN "Tiger" div to give you a few.

Kidder openly admits in his book he didn't walk any ground in Vietnam.  He stayed in one place the whole time and never left the base.  Thus he makes the perfect expert. 

Quote
Finally, in order to further counter Kidder's ineffective portrayal and sullying of the contribution of ASA DF men in the Vietnam War, please remember that the first American GI killed in the war was Spec 4 James Davis, a trained DF operator and early advisor to the ARVN.  For more information on Spec Davis, go to:  http://www.oldspooksandspies.org/davis/davis.html

Memorial day has just past.  On that day he was remembered!

M.S.
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« Reply #56 on: June 12, 2007, 12:27:49 PM »


My thoughts on the book:

Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province
by Eric M. Bergerud

I find this type of history to be dubious. The author looks at one province and then generalizes his findings over the entire South Vietnamese nation. If one were to look at the attitudes of American colonists during the Revolutionary war by region one would find great disparities of opinion and support for the independence cause. Some areas of the colonies were strongly loyalist. Did this make the independence movement less valid? Another example; take two cities in Texas, Austin and Fort Worth. Survey the populations of these areas about their opinions of President Bush. You would find greatly divergent aggregate views. My point is that this type of regional analysis is of limited use if you are trying to generalize over a population larger than the one investigated.

It was no different in Vietnam. There were areas where the locals strongly supported the insurgency, such as in the Iron Triangle which included Hau Nghia I believe. It is no surprise that the author found support for the insurgency here. On the other hand there were many places were the population strongly opposed the insurgency and even fled their arrival. Finally, let us not forget that during the Tet offensive there was no general uprising against the South Vietnamese government as the communists fully expected there would be. Quite to the contrary in fact. The ARVN fought valiantly and the general population tried to stay out of the way and let the military restore order. Much as the general population does in all conflicts.

This sort of parochial view of situations can have devastating effects on Policy, just as it did with the over throw of Ngo Dinh Diem. The Saigon elites wanted Diem gone. But the Saigon elites had no more in common with the populace at large in Vietnam as Wall Street Financiers have with Iowa wheat farmers. Again, the ideas of a small sampling were generalized over a large population and policy was formulated based on this. Another example of this concept can be found in one of the oft criticisms of Diem. Diem was often faulted for being a catholic in a predominantly Buddhist country. Calling Vietnam a Buddhist country is like calling the USA a Christian country. Probably most Americans call themselves Christian, but what does this mean? It means many things and encompasses many ideas. Ideas that are often at odds with each other. The same was true in Vietnam at the time. This kind of historic generalization is of limited usefulness to understanding the larger context. The Author should have refrained from extending his conclusions to the larger whole based on an otherwise interesting investigation.

As for those who served in Vietnam and had his opinions validated by this text. Again, this is a question of generalizing over the whole one's own personal experiences. We all like to think of ourselves as representative of everyone else, but this is not necessarily true either. I have the utmost respect for those who served in Vietnam. They did their duty during a difficult period in our history. However, most American service personnel did not speak the language, were isolated from the local population, and only received a limited understanding of the situation in Vietnam. How can one truly fromulate a concrete understanding of something in such circumstances? Also, is the perspective of the grunt humping the boonies going to be the same as a Saigon warrior? Clearly not. Many soldiers came away from Vietnam with opinions about the local population that were shaped by an extremely limited exposure to them in a myriad of different contexts. One does not have to look far, however, to find countless books by soldiers and civilians who worked closely with the Vietnamese and local populations and came to completely different conclusions. Most of the books written by those who understood the language, or dealt with the Vietnamese regularly show a strong belief in the cause of aiding the Vietnamese. Those who got to truly know the Vietnamese most frequently came away with a very positive feeling toward them, believed they were worthy of the efforts being expended by the USA, and were sincere in their desire to be free of communist domination.

It has been my intention here to point out the limitations of interpreting broad historical events by looking at microcosms in history. Having established this, I do believe that this book is a worthwhile read. It is an interesting regional investigation of a complex environment. I would just admonish people to approach it with an appreciation of its limitations and seek other sources to contrast this book with for a broader understanding of the war in general.

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« Reply #57 on: June 16, 2007, 10:14:11 PM »

"Most of our unwanted food was given away one can at a time to individuals we encountered on farms or foot paths.  I was touched by how many guys in the platoon, instead of throwing away an unwanted can of white bread or beans, would lug it around for two or three weeks just to give it to the next emaciated old lady who clearly needed the calories.  Doc Baldwin was always collecting discarded C's for this purpose.  Sometimes he had dozens of cans inside empty sandbags hanging from his backpack"   Flag Waver!

From "Blood Trails: The combat Diary of a Foot Soldier in Vietnam"  by Christopher Ronnau

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« Reply #58 on: June 26, 2007, 09:53:44 PM »

I just started reading "Strange War, Strange Strategy" by General Lewis Walt USMC.  Not far into it and it is very depressing.  He talks about the terror used by the communists to control the population.  Not very pleasant, but a real part of the history.

Just finished reading, "A Death in November" by Ellen Hammer.  This book is a detailed account of the events leading up to the coup to overthrow Ngo Dinh Diem, and his assassination.  Also a depressing book about the arrogant use of power.  I really believe that the USA was so confident in its beliefs back then that many policy makers never really tried to understand the Vietnamese nor cared that they didn't.  Pity. 
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« Reply #59 on: July 06, 2007, 05:54:46 PM »

I recently completed reading "A House in Hue" by Omar Eby.  This is the story of seven Christian Service aid workers who were trapped in Hue during the Tet offensive in 1968.  The story is primarily told through the experience of June Sauder, one of the Christian women. 

This is a very short book and quick read.  I had it done in an evening.  The story is mostly about the fear that the Americans felt as they hid while Communist soldiers were active in the street and neighborhood outside of the house.  The Christian workers were pacifists and disassociated themselves with the military aspect of the war.  It is this fact that I found particularly interesting. 

These Christian workers portrayed themselves to the local population as being against the war and not associated with the military.  Many of the Vietnamese they provided relief for openly expressed to these Americans how they disliked all other Americans.  It was a point of Pride to June Sauder when a VN told her that she hated all Americans except her.  There is a clear political perspective here.  OK, fine.  Everyone has one. 

My problems with this story have to do with incredulity and hypocrisy.  The Christian workers were terrified when they first saw Communist soldiers on the street in front of their house and they hid for the entire time.  They disassociated themselves with the military, yet their greatest desire during the siege was for a return of the United States Marines.  They were terrified of the Communists and wanted the Marines to return. 

"I see em! 'someone shouted from the door.  'U.S. Marines!  Hundreds of them!'  Rarely were Americans so glad to see U.S. Marines as were the seven VNCS volunteers, pacifists or no pacifists". 

They were grateful to receive the rescue of the Marines and then immediately availed themselves of the food, medical care, showers, and other facilities of the United States Military.  They were happy that it was over.  However, with the bellies full and a clean bill of health from American doctors behind them, they began to turn critical of the military.  Sauder ruminated that she hoped no marine had discharged his weapon at any time for her personal protection.  She believed not. 

Come on!  They would never have been able to re-capture the city and rescue them at their hide out had they not used their weapons.  They used them, and killed a lot of people.  Had they not, the relief workers would never have been rescued. 

She was critical of the force used by the Marines as they went house to house clearing the city of the enemy.  Sometimes civilians would be caught in the middle.  Of course there are two sides to this.  The middle is just that.  On one side are the Communists, the other side the Marines.  Naturally being in the middle is not a safe place to be.  But does that make it exclusively the fault of the Marines??

Sauder also speculated as to why the communists had not found and killed them.  She believed that they must have known that the relief workers were there and concluded that they Communists chose not to kill them because they know how much good they were trying to do for the local people. 

This conclusion was flawed in several ways.  While she was speculating as to why they were not killed, she reveals that relief workers found in other hiding places by the communists were killed.  Some of whom she believed to be even better relief workers who had done more for the local people than she and her group had.  Yet they were killed and her group was not.  So how can she conclude she was spared because of her groups care of the locals when others who did as much or more were not spared?  Also, she was a Christian.  Relief work or not, the Communists looked at everyone politically.  And Christians were a political enemy.  The communists routinely placed ideological necessity above any sort of recognition of contribution.  How many middle class business people, small land owners, and the families of such were executed even though they supported the Communist movement?  Political considerations always came first with the Communists.  If the communists had no compunction about killing people who actively supported them for political reasons, they would not have spared Christians just because they cared. 

Finally, when the Relief workers finally returned to their house they found it looted.  Everything was taken.  EVERYTHING.  No plates, furniture, household items of any kind were left.  Some of the local Vietnamese told her that the American Marines had taken everything and then complained that if this is what Americans are like they don't want them.  Of course, these are the same Vietnamese who said they didn't like the Americans in the first place.  Sauder took at face value that the Marines had stolen everything.  The Marines who she prayed would rescue her.  Now, if the house had been vandalized I could see a bunch of grunts doing this to blow off steam.  If somethings had been missing from the house that a Marine might use in his quarters, I could see this.  But for the house to be emptied of absolutely everything without any evidence of Vandalism strikes me as strange.  What is a combat Marine going to do with dinner plates and glass cups in a combat zone?  Maybe the isolated item a Marine might steel and take with him, but everything int he house.  Furniture and all?  I have a hard time believing that combat soldiers would empty a house in its entirety.  What could they have used the stuff for. 

The locals, on the other hand, could have put household items to very good use.  I think it is more likely that the locals looted the house while the relief workers were away availing themselves of the US Military food and care.  Sauder never even considers this idea.  She believes the big bad Marines did this.    After they rescued her. 

The locals also told her how the Communists soldiers while they were occupying Hue were always proper.  They were polite and if they took something they paid for it.  Again, she takes this at face value. 

If the communists were so benevolent and proper, why wasn't there the mass rising among the civilian population of Hue in support of them?  Where did they get the money to pay for everything?  Most of the times during the war the Communist soldiers weren't paid and didn't have any money.  And finally, what about all the executed civilians and mass graves of the thousands murdered by the communists while they held control of the city? 

No, I think it is clear that some of the people that were taking handouts from Sauder and her group of relief workers were Communists or Communist sympathizers who had her ear.  She wanted to believe them and she did.  And they looted her house. 

Sauder and this book were gullible and naive. 

But the Marines did rescue her and the other Americans.  That is a factual conclusion. 

Semper Fi

M.S. 
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